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The credit rating market is characterized by low competition and a potential conflict of interest, 
due to the system of remuneration of the rating services, which impairs the reliability of the 
judgement delivered. Multiple credit rating means further costs for companies, because of the fees 
paid to more than one rating agency, but it does bring significant benefits in terms of the 
dissemination, on the market, of judgements concerning the companies. 
This paper examines the relationship between the number of rating announcements concerning a 
company and the performance of the securities issued by that company, besides the effects of 
discordant ratings assigned to a company by different rating agencies (so-called “split rating”), and 
presents a detailed study of multiple credit rating and of the advantages determined by the 
placement of issued securities at higher prices, in connection with the new ratings assigned by 
different agencies. An analysis of split-rating completes this overview of the issue, highlighting 




Investors in the financial markets do not have access to the same sets of information 
(Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984), and large-scale differences among participants trading on the 
same market (i.e. horizontal information asymmetry) may negatively affect capital flows (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). From the beginning credit rating has represented a solution to the problem, 
making available to all investors the same set of information (Partnoy, 1999): the judgement 
delivered by a rating agency, qualitatively summarizes the information available on the market 
and the confidential information in the rating class (Cowan, 1991).  
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The recent financial failures of several very prominent companies have had negative 
repercussions on the credibility of the major rating agencies. Criticism of the agencies’ behaviour 
focuses primarily on their effective independence from the companies they rate: agencies, in fact, 
are deemed to have a propensity to up-rate rather than down-rate (Larrymore, 2003), so their 
judgements cannot be considered a trustworthy measure of the real value of the rated securities. 
This lack of trust by the market could determine an increase in the costs incurred by 
companies in collecting capital resources: a possible solution to this problem is multiple credit 
rating. The decision to hire more than one rating agency, in fact, can greatly diminish the 
likelihood of collusion between the rater and the ratee, and a concordant evaluation by different 
agencies could enhance the significance of the rating assignment (Ellis, 1997). 
This paper examines multiple rating, assessing the pros and cons for companies and the 
different impact it can have, depending on the nature of the rating agencies involved. The 
analysis is completed by a study of the impact of the different ratings by different agencies to the 
same company (split-rating), and the effects this may have on the securities issued by that 
company: in particular, it explores whether the characteristics of the one or more rating agencies 
concerned play a role in the market’s reaction to changes in rating. 
Paragraph two focuses on the theories relating to the pros and cons of the decision to undergo 
multiple rating,  in order to avoid the problems related to the establishment of an unhealthy 
relationship between the rating agency and the rated company. In connection with this issue, the 
paper examines the scientific debate relating to the optimum number of rating agencies to be 
called in for evaluation purposes, and analyses the theories that explain the different impact 
multiple rating can have based on the characteristics of the single agencies.  
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Last but not least, paragraph three explores the current structure of the credit rating market, 
highlighting the level of international competition and the weight the single agencies have in the 
domestic markets, providing an overview of the present importance and future prospects of 
multiple rating. 
2.  Theories about multi-rating 
 
Theoretically rating agencies offers an objective evaluation of firms and aim to define 
prudential evaluations for the risk of reputation losses. (De Laurentis 2001) Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the relationship between a securities issuer and a rating agency entails the 
frequent exchange of information and - in the medium-to-long term - the interests of the two 
parties may converge, leading the agency to favour its client by assigning a particularly 
favourable rating. (Butler and Rodgers 2003) 
Many studies have shown how the larger the number of agencies involved in the credit rating 
process, the more independent and reliable that process will appear to the market; and if the 
ratings assigned by the different agencies ultimately agree, this may generate - in the long run - 
positive effects on the price of the issued securities. (Irvine, 2002) 
Moreover, multiple rating could also represent a means for achieving the following goals: 
 
¾  obtaining financing at lower interest rates, thus creating the conditions for charging 
intermediaries less, in terms of asset requirements (Hill, 2003), in the event supervisory  
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authorities provide that these requirements may be estimated in accordance with the 
borrower’s rating;
1 
¾  giving out positive signals to the market, by requesting other agencies to assign a rating, 
in order to provide a full picture of the issuer’s financial potential and, consequently, to 
place the issued securities at better prices. (Millon and Thakor, 1985) 
 
Multi-rating has significant advantages, especially if the new rating is better than the 
previous ratings (Sorensen, 1979): therefore, if all the rating agencies have an equal reputation, 
companies will prefer to hire the services of those which, as a rule, assign more favourable 
ratings (so-called “rating shopping”). (Linciano, 2004) 
The fact that positive effects only ensue as a result of the announcement of a good rating by a 
rating agency tends to encourages issuing companies to hire those that disclose the results of the 
rating assignment process only with the companies’ consent: in this case, the rating can be 
assimilated to an option exercised by the company, with the decision to divulge its rating only if 
this translates into favourable effects for the company. (Jewell and Livingston, 1999) 
 
2.1 The objectives pursued by companies 
 
The evaluation of the securities issued by a company depends on all the available 
information, and investors, faced with multiple ratings by different agencies, need to find the 
way to combine this information with the signals given out by the market. Multiple rating may 
                                                 
1 The revision of the Basel Accord examines the issue of multiple credit rating and sets forth the modalities for 
determining asset requirements, with respect to the standard approach based on the external rating of borrowers. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards: a revised framework, par. 96-98.  
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have different effects on the performance of the securities issued by a single issuer, based on the 
market reactions in a multiple rating context: the reactions, in fact, may be grounded on, (i) the 
worst available rating, (ii) the best available rating, or (iii) the average value of the assigned 
ratings. (Cantor, Packer and Cole, 1997) In the first and second cases, only one rating is taken 
into account, for simplification purposes (namely, the worst in the former, the best in the latter), 
while the choice of the third case implies the further problem of defining the weight to be given 
to the single ratings assigned by the different agencies, based on the characteristics and 
reputation of each. 
From the company’s point of view, the decision to call in more than one rater poses the 
problem of defining the optimum number of ratings, based on the costs incurred under and the 
benefits entailed by the different solutions. 
The rating assignment process, in fact, obviously entails a cost for the company - the rating 
agency fees - and the decision to increase the number of agencies called in ultimately translates 
into higher costs. The issuing company, therefore, needs (i) to assess the incremental advantage 
inherent in the choice to hire more than one rating agency, and (ii) to compare the expected 
(possible) gain from placing its securities at higher prices, with the certain costs represented by 
the fees payable to the new rating agency(ies).(Backer and Mansi, 2001) 
  The larger the number of available ratings is, the lower will be the impact of the further 
evaluations made by other rating agencies. (Thompson e Vaz, 1990) Market surveys, in fact, 
show that while many companies have used multiple rating  to inform the market of their 
financial potential, very few companies hire the services of more than three agencies at any one 
time. (Ellis, 1997)  
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  The relationship between the number of existing ratings and the impact of a new rating may 
be explained in the light of the usefulness these ratings have for investors. The existence of a 
number of ratings gives investors a fuller picture for making their investment decisions, and may 
diminish the perceived investment risk. The down side for investors, however, is that the larger 
the number of ratings available, the higher will be the data processing costs. The final gist of the 
matter is that, when assessing a company, investors will favourably consider the possibility of 
comparing different ratings provided by different agencies but, if the number of ratings 
increases, they will inevitably end up by making a selection: the advantages of multiple credit 
rating are highest with a limited number of ratings, and tend to diminish the more ratings there 
are. 
 
2.2 Empirical surveys in literature 
 
Empirical surveys have investigated the effects of changes in ratings by different agencies 
and of the ratings assigned by new agencies. Multiple rating may affect the performance of 
securities, with respect to both the stock capital (shares) and the debt capital (bonds), and its 
effect varies according to the characteristics of the market in question (liquidity, frequency of 
negotiations, and types of market participants). (Gonzelez, Haas, Johannes, Persson, Toledo, 
Violi, Wieland and Zins, 2004) 
The studies conducted on securities issuing have taken account of the impact of the changes 
in the issuer’s rating, or of the changes in the rating of a single bond issue, on trading in the 
primary and secondary markets. The assessment of the impact of the new rating, therefore, 
examines whether there is an anomalous performance of bond prices in the run up to the issuing  
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date, or the reviewing of the rating, while the other conditions are unchanged (degree of 
subordination, accessory clauses, duration and amount of the coupons).(Kose, Ravid and Reisel, 
2003) 
The primary market analyses are based on the assumption that the spread between the bond 
yield and the return on riskless securities depends on the likelihood of default, and on the 
expected loss from the bond investment. (Collin–Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001) New 
rating announcements provide the market with previously unavailable information, and the 
placement price of the new securities is affected by how the market interprets this new 
information.  
The different methods used by rating agencies for assessing companies may determine 
different ratings for the same company (so-called “split rating”). This is generally considered by 
the bond market as an investment risk factor (Gabbi and Sironi, 2002) and, consequently, could 
translate into higher placement costs for new bonds. (Santos, 2003) 
The impossibility to analyze continuous historical series has introduced the need to broaden 
the investigation and take account of bond trading on the secondary market too. The study of the 
relationship between secondary market performance and rating assignment/reviewing highlights 
a different reaction by the bonds to up-rating and down-rating, also with reference to the industry 
sector of the rated company. The empirical evidence, however, is heavily influenced by the low 
efficiency of the market, which determines a diminished, or sluggish, reaction to the newly 
available information. (Katz , 1974) 
In consideration of the shortcomings of the bond market, a number of studies have focused 
on the market of stocks issued by rated companies, analysing the impact of new or revised rating 
announcements on stock performance. (Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992) Analysing the  
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impact of up-rating and down-rating of companies or bonds on stock quotations, it has been 
found that, in the medium-to-long term, there are positive (negative) effects in connection with 
the up-rating (down-rating) by a certain agency. (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001) Investigations 
carried out in the stock market have shown that a revised or new rating by an agency - in a 
multiple rating context - may differ according to the notoriety, nationality and expertise of the 
agency itself, for example. (Norden and Weber, 2003) 
 
2.3 Multiple rating and the characteristics of the rating agencies 
  
The value of the service supplied by rating agencies is based on their reputation, and a 
different reputation determines a different degree of importance of the rating assigned on the 
investors’ decisions. (Mann, 1999) 
The analysis of the ratings assigned by agencies shows that investors react differently to the 
available information on a company, based on the characteristics of the agency announcing them. 
The principal differences among rating agencies consist in the reactivity of the rating to the new 
information and to the different capacity of the models employed to assess the credit risk of 
companies operating in certain industry sectors or countries.  
Small differences of assessment may simply be due to the different sets of information used 
for rating purposes, besides the different requirements imposed on the company in order to 
ensure its ongoing inclusion in a certain rating class. Based on the analysed data and adopted 
criteria it is possible that the evaluations made by a certain agency are more or less reactive to 
the changes occurring in the company’s characteristics. (Tabakis and Vinci, 2002)  
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The different reactivity of the assessment is obvious, above all, when one examines the rating 
classes that discriminate between investment grade and non-investment grade securities: it is 
possible, in fact, to distinguish between agencies assigning ratings sensitive to any new 
information on a company, from those that proceed to up-rate or down-rate a company only in 
the face of very significant changes. (Johnson, 2003) 
Moreover, there can be significant differences in the rating assignment by the same agency if, 
in the period concerned, there are substantial changes in the assessment criteria used to identify 
the class in which to rate the company. (Blume, Lim and Mackinlay, 1998) The market 
assessment of a rating announced by an agency, therefore, may change in time, according to the 
changes perceived in the evaluation criteria employed. 
The characteristics of the industry sector and/or of the country where the company is based 
can affect the credit riskiness of the company, (Ammer and Parker, 2000) and the agencies’ 
capacity to accurately assess it. (Grier and Katz, 1976) The rating’s capacity to accurately 
determine the risk profiles of an investment in companies operating in a certain industry sector or 
country partially depends on the broadness of the benchmark sample on which the rating model 
is calibrated (Ang and Patel, 1975) the bigger the number of companies belonging to a certain 
sector and/or country assessed by the agency, the greater the capacity of the model employed by 
the agency to accurately identify the risk profiles of the investment in securities issued by 
companies with the same characteristics. (Ederington, Yavitz and Roberts, 1986) Differences in 
the calibration of the analysis models cause agencies to assign systematically different ratings: 
some agencies, in fact, tend to overestimate the riskiness of certain types of companies, while 
others may underestimate it. (Cantor and Packer, 1995) Irrespective of the problems related to 
the possibility of conducting assessments based on more or less broad samples of customer  
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companies, there is empirical evidence of the fact that locally-based companies are assessed 
according to more favourable criteria by certain rating agencies, especially the smaller ones 
(home country bias). (Beattie and Searle, 1992) 
Moreover, it has been found that split ratings for the same company has different effects on 
different industry sectors. This type of split rating is typical primarily of those companies that 
post intangible assets in their financial statements whose evaluation is greatly influenced by the 
analysis criteria. (Morgan, 1997) 
Split-rating can be interpreted differently by the market, according to the relative weight 
given by the market participants concerned to the discordant announcements: the higher the 
value given by the market to the discordant announcement, the greater and prompter the reaction 
to the split-rating assignment. 
 
3.  Prospects for the future 
 
It can be reasonably expected that the lesser the certainty of the objectivity of the rating 
service, the greater the spread of multiple rating. Currently, there is no quality certification for 
rating agencies
2 and the objectivity of rating announcements can be guaranteed solely by the 
agencies’ desire to maintain their reputation intact: trust by the market, in fact, is a decisive 
factor for any rating agency’s future capacity to sell its services on the market. (Kuhner, 2001) 
Historical development and the future prospects relating to the level of competition on the credit 
rating market, seem to outline positive scenarios for the spread of this instrument. 
                                                 
2 The only form of certification available on the credit rating market is the recognition by the supervisory authority 




The characteristics of the service supplied and the possibility of effectively exploiting the 
economies of scale (Williamson, 1969), in fact, constitute the premises for the creation of an 
oligopoly (Ferri, 2001), with entry barriers represented by the costs needed to acquire the 
necessary reputation to operate. (Partnoy, 2001) 
The current market situation may be summarized in the following diagram (graph 1), which 
shows the number of rating agencies in the different markets broken down by geographical area. 
Graph 1 
 
The distribution of rating agencies worldwide 
 
      Source: data supplied by the agencies and processed by the author 
 
The analysis of the world market highlights a low concentration of agencies, ranging between 
a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 23 per continent: the number of agencies on each market, 
therefore, is not sufficient in itself to conclude that the markets are competitive and, if one adopts 
more stringent geographical criteria, the number of potential competitors in each market drops 
even more,
3 especially in developing countries. (Ferri, Liu and Majnoni, 2001) The geographical 
areas featuring the highest number of agencies, moreover, are characterized by an absolute 
                                                 









predominance of small agencies, in some cases belonging to the public sector, delivering 
spontaneous rating services: the rating market, therefore, is the reserve of a limited number of 
private agencies.  
The small number of rating agencies on the market (less than 50) can be justified in the light 
of the strategies adopted by the agencies to compete on the market. Agencies, in fact, have no 
incentives to compete, with regard to the stringency of the assessment criteria or the fees applied 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2002): in the former case, the adopted policies would determine a loss of the 
trust by the market in the medium-to-long term; while in the latter case, the decision to cut 
proceeds would have a negative effect on profits, because the rating process costs are 
substantially fixed costs. Therefore, rating agencies tend to pursue a “tolerable” competition, 
such as not to reduce their profits and not to risk impairing their reputation by introducing less 
stringent rating practices (White, 1981). 
Another market profile capable of affecting the reliability of the rating service consists of the 
mergers and acquisitions concerning many agencies, especially towards the end of the 1990s 
(table 1). 











Absorbed company  Type of 
operation 
1990 S&P  ADEF  Acquisition 
1990  S&P  Insurance Solvency International   Acquisition 
1991 Fitch  Euronotation  France  Acquisition 
1995 Fitch  Broda,  Dominguez  Acquisition 
1997 Fitch  IBCA  Merger 
1998 JBRI  Nippon  Investor  Service  Merger 
1999  Moody’s  Value Clasificadora de Riesgo  Acquisition 
1999  Moody’s  Clasificadora de Riesgo Humphreys Lim.  Acquisition 
1999  Moody’s  Dagong Global Credit Rating   Acquisition 
1999  Moody’s  Ratto-Humphreys Clasificadora de Riesgo   Acquisition 
1999  Moody’s  Risk Analysis Clasificadora de Riesgo  Acquisition 
2000  Fitch  Duff & Phelps  Merger 
2000  Fitch  Center European Rating agency  Acquisition 
2000  Moody’s  Humphreys Clasificadora de Riesgo  Acquisition 
2000 S&P  Canadian  Rating  Agency  Acquisition 
2001  Moody’s  CRA Rating Agency  Acquisition 
2001  Moody’s  Korea Investor Service  Acquisition 
2002 Fitch  Italrating  Acquisition 
2002 Moody’s  ICRA    Acquisition 
2003  Moody’s   Interfax Rating Agency  Acquisition 
2004  Fitch  Clasificadora de Riesgo  Acquisition 
Source: data supplied by the agencies and processed by the author 
 
The higher concentration and limited number of agencies amplifies the problems posed by 
limited competition in the industry, and the future prospects of the markets do not help to outline 
a different scenario. The Basel Committee, in fact, seems to define an even less competitive 
segment of potential rating service suppliers for financial intermediaries. The last version of the 
accord envisages that, in order for the ratings assigned by the agencies to be applied for  
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regulatory purposes - to determine the capital requirements according to the standard approach - 
the following requirements must be met:
4 
 
¾  objectivity of the assessment methods; 
¾  indipendence from economic and political pressures; 
¾  international access to the data and transparency of the information provided; 
¾  sufficient resources to ensure service quality; 
¾  credibility of the service and internal procedures capable of preventing the improper use 
of the information. 
 
The stringent application of the criteria proposed by the Basel Committee, therefore, would 
prevent several agencies from continuing to operate and supply their services to the 
intermediaries. The rating market thus seems set to increased concentration, which could further 
reduce the number of competitors.  
The prospects for the future seem to outline an increasingly oligopolistic market and the lack 
of competition could encourage the supply of services leading to a scarcely objective assessment 
of companies. Given the low level of competition on the credit rating market, investors might 
consider the rating to be influenced by the relationship established between the agency and the 
company concerned, and consequently take little notice of it for information purposes (Galik, 
2002).  To date, no statistics have been gathered relating to the number of companies rated by the 
agencies, but the analyses contained in the available literature show that in Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), International convergence of capital measurement and capital 




countries it is a consolidated practice to hire the services of more than one rating agency, with a 
view to supporting the placement of corporate bonds, and this practice has become a useful tool 
for fostering investments in the bonds by institutional investors (Smith and Walter, 2001). The 
greater detail that characterizes the analyses conducted by these stakeholders on the investment 
opportunities, in fact, leads to an improved response to the availability of a number of ratings by 
different agencies, which might not be adequately taken into account by individual investors. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The rating market is characterized by a lack of essential conditions for assuring competition 
and the objectivity of the ratings assigned is ensured solely by the reputation of the rating 
agencies. The need to maintain one’s current reputation is the sole deterrent against an 
opportunistic behaviour on many financial markets (Diamond 1989); but on the credit rating 
market, in order to further reduce the problems descending from the impossibility of an ex ante 
assessment of the quality of the services supplies, alternative solutions may be found, such as 
multiple credit rating. 
Multiple rating means higher costs for companies, which are required to pay the fees of more 
than one agency. Such a decision may be justified only if the indirect return on this investment - 
translating into the possibility of placing one’s securities on the market at higher prices - is 
sufficiently high. The empirical surveys presented in the literature on the subject highlight the 
possibility of making profits through by this means, but there are numerous difficulties in 
quantifying the overall impact on securities issued by a company, in connection with a new 
rating announcement by a different agency. (Mattarocci, 2005)  
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The impact of split-rating varies according to the characteristics of the rating agency and, in 
particular, the more influent the agency, the higher the securities-trading impact of the different 
rating announcement. The effect of changes in rating is also influenced by the nationality and 
industry sector of the company concerned: ratings by domestic agencies are more highly 
considered by investors, and a greater expertise in a certain sector is highly appreciated by the 
market, which thus takes its judgement into greater account. 
The evolution of the rating market, and its future prospects, seems to outline a number of 
scenarios in which the choice by companies to call in more than one rating agency might bring 
greater benefits and represent not only a possible alternative but, in some cases, become a 
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Reference markets and countries examined by  rating agencies 
 
Rating agency  Principal markets 
 
Rating agency  Principal markets 
 
A.M. Best Co.  > 65 countries  JCR-VIS Credit Rating Co. Ltd  Pakistan 
Australian Rating Agency  > 10 countries  Lace Financial Corp.  > 20 countries 
Bonniers Kreditfackta I Norden AB  Sweden  Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad  Malaysia 
CA Ratings  South Africa  Mikuni & co.  Japan 
Capital Intelligence  > 35 countries  Moody’s Investors Service  > 70 countries 
Companhia Portuguesa de Rating  > 10 countries  Neufeld Credit Information AB  Sweden 
Credit Analysis & Research   India  Pakistan Credit Rating Agency  Pakistan 
Credit Rating Information Services of India   India  Philippine Rating Services   Philippines 
Credit Safe AB  Sweden  Rating Agency Malaysia Berhard  > 20 countries 
Dominion Bond Rating Service  Canada  R@S rating Services AG  Germany 
Dun & Bradstreet  > 230 countries  Shanghai Far East Credit Rating  Shangai 
Edgan-Jones Rating Co.  > 50 countries  Standard & Poor’s  > 70 countries 
Equilibrium Clasificadora de Riesgo  Peru and  San Salvador  SVEA Kredit-Information AB  Sweden 
Euro-Ratings AG  Germany and Austria  SVEFO Svrevige AB  Sweden 
Feller Schleyer Rating Clasificadora de Riesgo South America  Taiwan Rating Corporation  Taiwan 
Fitch IBCA  > 70 countries  Thai Information Service  Thailand 
Focus Investment Rating Company  > 50 countries  Thomson Financial Bankwatch  > 85 countries 
Global Credit Ratings  > 10 countries  Unternehmensratingagentur AG  Germany 
Instantia Creditsystem AB International  Sweden  Upplysnigscentralen AB  Sweden and Norway 
Japan Credit Rating Agency  > 20 countries  Veribanc  United States 
Japan Rating and Investment Information  > 35 countries  Weiss Rating Inc.  United States 
Source: data supplied by the agencies and processed by the author 